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Unravelling the Niger Coup: Shifting Dynamics, Colonial Legacies, and Geopolitical Implications
On July 26, the National Council for Safeguarding the Homeland (CNSP) staged a bloodless coup d’état in Niger, ousting the civilian elected government. This is the sixth successful military intervention in Africa since August 2020, and the fifth in the Sahel region. Of the six core Sahelian countries, only Mauritania has a civilian government. In 2019, it marked its first successful civilian transition of power since the 2008 military intervention, which saw the junta transitioning to power in 2009 as the civilian president.
Military intervention in politics is not a new phenomenon in Africa. Over 90% of African countries have experienced military interventions in politics with over 200 successful and failed coups since 1960 – 1, (the year of independence). To date, the motivation of these interventions revolves around insecurity, wasteful and poor management of state resources, corruption, and poor and weak social governance. Sadly, the current situation in many African countries shows these indicators are in no short supply, hence the adoption of coup proofing measures to overcome supposed coup traps.
The literature evidences adopting ethnic coup proofing dynamics and colonial military practices and decolonisation as possible coup-proofing measures. However, the recent waves of coups in the Sahel defer this logic, and are tilting towards severing ties with the living-past neocolonial presence and domination. The Nigerien coup orchestrated by the CNSP has sent shockwaves throughout the region and internationally over this reason. Before the coup, Mali and France had a diplomatic row. The Malian junta demanded that France and its Western allies withdraw their troops from Mali immediately. These troops were part of Operation Barkhane and Taskforce Takuba. A wave of anti-French sentiments and protests resulted over the eroding credibility of France and accusation of been an occupying force. Mohamed Bazoum, the deposed Nigerien president, accepted the withdrawn French troops and its Western allies in Niger. This was frowned at by the Nigerien military, and as evidenced by the bloodless coup, similar anti-French sentiments resulted in Bazoum’s deposition.
The ousting of President Bazoum resulted in numerous reactions, including a decision by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), of which Niger is a member and is currently chaired by Nigerian President Bola Ahmed Tinubu. ECOWAS demanded the release and reinstatement of President Bazoum, imposed economic sanctions, and threatened military intervention with a one-week ultimatum. Some argued that the military intervention is unlikely, and some member states pledged support to the junta. At the end of the ultimatum, ECOWAS activated the deployment of its regional standby force but it remains unclear when it will intervene and what the rules of engagement will be. Nonetheless, the junta considers any such act as an aggression, and in addition to closing its airspace, it is understood to have sought support from Wagner, the Russian mercenary.
Amongst the citizenry, while some oppose the military intervention, there is popular support for both the intervention and the military with thousands rallying support for the junta. On 6 August, about 30,000 supporters filled the Niamey stadium chanting and applauding the military junta as they parade the crowd-filled stadium. Anti-French sentiments including a protest that led to an attack on the French embassy in Niger followed the declaration of the coup action. In the civil-military relations literature, when a military assumes high political roles yet has high support from society over such actions, it is considered as a popular praetorian military (Sarigil, 2011, p.268). While this is not a professional military attribute (Musa and Heinecken, 2022), it is nonetheless supported by the citizenry.
In my doctoral thesis, I argued that in situations where the population is discontent and dissatisfied with the policies of the political leadership, a civil-military relations crisis could result. I argued that “as citizens are aware that the military is neither predatory nor self-serving, they are happy trusting and supporting the military to restore political stability in the state. It is possible that in situations where political instability becomes intense, large sections of the citizenry could encourage the military to intervene in politics” (Musa, 2018, p.71). The recent waves of military intervention in Africa, together with anti-colonial sentiments evidences this, and further supports my argument on the role of the citizenry in civil-military relations. For many Nigeriens including Maïkol Zodi who leads an anti-foreign troops movement in Niger, the coup symbolises the political independence and stability that Francophone Africa has long desired.
Thus, as the events continue to unfold, I would like to end this blog with some questions that I have been thinking about as I try to make sense of this rather complex military intervention. The intervention is affecting international relations and has the potential to destabilise the current power balance between the major powers. It could also lead to a military conflict in Africa, which would be a disaster for the continent.
- How have recent coups in the Sahel region signalled a shift away from colonial legacies, and how are these sentiments reshaping political dynamics?
- What is the significance of the diplomatic tensions between Mali and France, and how might they have influenced the ousting of President Bazoum and the reactions to it?
- Given the surge in military interventions in politics across the Sahel region, how does this trend reflect evolving dynamics within the affected countries, and does this has the potential to spur similar interventions in other African States?
- What lessons can be drawn from Mauritania’s successful transition from military to civilian rule in 2019, and how might these insights contribute to diplomatic discussions around possible transition to civilian rule in Niger?
- Are the decisions of ECOWAS influenced by external pressures, how effective is ECOWAS’s approach to addressing coups within member states, and how does the Niger coup test the regional organization’s capacity for conflict resolution?
- To what extent do insecurity, mismanagement of resources, corruption, and poor governance collectively contribute to the susceptibility of African nations to military interventions?
- How can African governments strike a balance between improving the quality of life and coup-proofing measures, and which is most effective for preventing or mitigating the risk of military interventions?
- What are the potential ramifications of the coup on the geopolitical landscape, especially in terms of altering power dynamics among major players?
- What are the implications of the coup for regional stability, and how might it contribute to the potential outbreak of conflict and could it destabilize ongoing counterterrorism efforts and impact cooperation among countries in addressing common security threats?
- Why do widespread demonstrations of support for the junta underscore the sentiments of political independence and stability that resonate across Francophone Africa?
- Given the complexities of the situation, what measures can be taken to ensure long-term stability, governance improvement, and democratic progress in Niger?
- Ultimately, is the western midwifed democracy in Africa serving its purpose, and given the poor living conditions of the vast populace in African countries as measured against all indices, can these democracies serve Africans?
Navigating these questions is essential for comprehending the implications of the coup and the potential outcomes for Niger and its neighbours. In an era where regional stability and international relations are at stake, a nuanced understanding of these multifaceted issues is imperative for shaping informed responses and sustainable solutions.
References
Musa, S.Y. (2018) Military Internal Security Operations in Plateau State, North Central Nigeria: Ameliorating or Exacerbating Insecurity? PhD, Stellenbosch University. Available from: https://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/104931. [Accessed 7 March 2019].
Musa, S.Y., Heinecken, L. (2022) The Effect of Military (Un)Professionalism on Civil-Military Relations and Security in Nigeria. African Security Review. 31(2), 157–173.
Sarigil, Z. (2011) Civil-Military Relations Beyond Dichotomy: With Special Reference to Turkey. Turkish Studies. 12(2), 265–278.
Reflecting on reflection
For some years now students taking the third year Critiquing Criminalistics module on our criminology course at the university have had an assessment relating to a reflective diary. Most educators and those in other professions will be aware of and understand the advantage of reflection and reflective diaries so it is probably not necessary to revisit the well-rehearsed arguments about benefits to learning and personal development. Each year, I have found that over the course of the module, the students have come to recognise this and have intimated how they have enjoyed reflecting on what they have learnt in the class or how reflecting on personal experiences has been beneficial. And they comment on how they have sought out further information to gain additional knowledge or to put what they have learnt in some form of perspective. It is of course what we as educators would want and expect from a reflective diary assessment that after all counts towards their marks for the module.
What has surprised me though is how much reviewing these modules has benefited me. I have learnt from and continue to learn my students. We all recognise or at least should the old saying ‘the more I know, the more I realise I don’t know’ or similar. My students prove that is the case often with each round of diary entries I review. The diaries can provide an insight into students lives and thoughts. For some of them it may be a cathartic release to capture their feelings on paper, for me it is enlightening and provides a greater understanding of some of the challenges they face not only as students but also as predominately young adults in a challenging and at times hostile social and economic environment. Perhaps what is equally as enlightening is the additional knowledge that students provide about the subject area being discussed and taught. It is almost like sending out my own little army of literature reviewers with a challenge to advance their knowledge and ipso facto, mine. I am clear that part of the reflection process is about taking what you have learnt further and as this an assessment, demonstrating this additional knowledge with some academic rigor. And so, I find that in some cases what I have stated in the class (currently online) is challenged and that challenge is supported by academic reading. When I read some of these little gems, I smile but alongside this is the additional work created as I review the journal article they have referenced and then decide whether to revisit my lectures to add in the additional information. Even if I don’t, it all adds to my knowledge and, on reflection as my students are proving, there is plenty of scope to find out more.
Am I a criminologist? Are you a criminologist?
I’m regularly described as a criminologist, but more loathe to self-identify as such. My job title makes clear that I have a connection to the discipline of criminology, yet is that enough? Can any Tom, Dick or Harry (or Tabalah, Damilola or Harriet) present themselves as a criminologist, or do you need something “official” to carry the title? Is it possible, as Knepper suggests, for people to fall into criminology, to become ‘accidental criminologists’ (2007: 169). Can you be a criminologist without working in a university? Do you need to have qualifications that state criminology, and if so, how many do you need (for the record, I currently only have 1 which bears that descriptor)? Is it enough to engage in thinking about crime, or do you need practical experience? The historical antecedents of theoretical criminology indicate that it might not be necessary, whilst the existence of Convict Criminology suggests that experiential knowledge might prove advantageous….
Does it matter where you get your information about crimes, criminals and criminal justice from? For example, the news (written/electronic), magazines, novels, academic texts, lectures/seminars, government/NGO reports, true crime books, radio/podcasts, television/film, music and poetry can all focus on crime, but can we describe this diversity of media as criminology? What about personal experience; as an offender, victim or criminal justice practitioner? Furthermore, how much media (or experience) do you need to have consumed before you emerge from your chrysalis as a fully formed criminologist?
Could it be that you need to join a club or mix with other interested persons? Which brings another question; what do you call a group of criminologists? Could it be a ‘murder’ (like crows), or ‘sleuth’ (like bears), or a ‘shrewdness’ (like apes) or a ‘gang’ (like elks)? (For more interesting collective nouns, see here). Organisations such as the British, European and the American Criminology Societies indicate that there is a desire (if not, tradition) for collectivity within the discipline. A desire to meet with others to discuss crime, criminality and criminal justice forms the basis of these societies, demonstrated by (the publication of journals and) conferences; local, national and international. But what makes these gatherings different from people gathering to discuss crime at the bus stop or in the pub? Certainly, it is suggested that criminology offers a rendezvous, providing the umbrella under which all disciplines meet to discuss crime (cf. Young, 2003, Lea, 2016).
Is it how you think about crime and the views you espouse? Having been subjected to many impromptu lectures from friends, family and strangers (who became aware of my professional identity), not to mention, many heated debates with my colleagues and peers, it seems unlikely. A look at this blog and that of the BSC, not to mention academic journals and books demonstrate regular discordance amongst those deemed criminologists. Whilst there are commonalities of thought, there is also a great deal of dissonance in discussions around crime. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a group of criminologists will be able to provide any kind of consensus around crime, criminality and criminal justice.
Mannheim proposed that criminologists should engage in ‘dangerous thoughts’ (1965: 428). For Young, such thinking goes ‘beyond the immediate and the pragmatic’ (2003: 98). Instead, ‘dangerous thoughts’ enable the linking of ‘crime and penality to the deep structure of society’ (Young, 2003: 98). This concept of thinking dangerously and by default, not being afraid to think differently, offers an insight into what a criminologist might do.
I don’t have answers, only questions, but perhaps it is that uncertainty which provides the defining feature of a criminologist…
References:
Knepper Paul, (2007), Criminology and Social Policy, (London: Sage)
Lea, John, (2016), ‘Left Realism: A Radical Criminology for the Current Crisis’, International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy, 5, 3: 53-65
Mannheim, Hermann, (1965), Comparative Criminology: A Textbook: Volume 2, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul)
Young, Jock, (2003), ‘In Praise of Dangerous Thoughts,’ Punishment and Society, 5, 1: 97-107